CHAPTER TEN

NATIONALISMS, NATIONS AND STATES:
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

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The study of Africa cannot be insulated from studies of processes and social and political phenomena elsewhere. Interpreting African histories and societies can identify or focus attention on questions arising in other contexts. This is not, as Eric Morier-Genoud explains in introducing the volume, to search for overarching generalisations or to provide an "updated systematic view." We "need to reject linear, evolutionist and teleological narratives and restore diversity, complexity and uncertainty". The timely aim of the contributors is to rescue histories from the authority of the victors, or from their denunciation, and to inquire into "historical processes which are contingent, contextual, and fought over", of which these histories are themselves a crucial and revealing part.

State and Nation as Ideas and Practices

The first task of a study of "nations" and "nationalisms" is to interrogate their meanings, as defined both by historical actors and those who study them. Michel Cahen instructs us here to "Stop confusing State, Nation, Nation-state". What is 'the state'? The 'state' is clearly a 'social fact', as described by Emile Durkheim: "... exercising ... an external constraint" and "which is general throughout a given society while... existing in its own right, independent of its individual manifestations"[1]. Contra Durkheim, the state is *not a thing*. It is, Philip Abrams explained, '*an Idea*'. It is the

[1] Émile Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, New York: Free Press, 1982 [1895], p. 52.

"collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies". "There is a *state*-system: a palpable nexus of practice and institutions centred in government…"[2]. Taken together, they exercise "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force over a given territory"[3]; the right and capacity to collect revenue and rents; the institutions for classifying people and ordering society; the means for providing resources; and enabling its intermediaries to control the gate[4] through which they are distributed. The State may be an 'Idea', but it is real enough in its consequences[5].

The 'Nation' is itself an 'Idea', the collective mis/representation, to which nationalists or 'nationists'[6], attach substantive meanings formed and reformed from disparate materials. It is necessary to the ideologies and projects of nationalism and the purposes for which they can be deployed[7]. Nationalisms in Africa had origins and took forms, which were often dissimilar, and even contradictory. Nationalist political discourses were modern and modernist, constructed within political discourses to contest and to legitimate public values and national citizenship[8]. They converged on the demand for control of state power which provided instruments for realising the coupled 'nationalist' project of bringing political and economic resources under the control of a new 'political class'[9] and 'developmental' project of large-scale manufacturing and farming and providing services to the people[10].

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[2] Philip Abrams, "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 48. Linzi Manicom, "Ruling relations: rethinking state and gender in South African history" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 33, p. 455, cited by Alice Dinerman, *Counter-Revolution and Revisionism: the case of Mozambique, 1975–1994.* London: Routledge, 2006, p. 47.

[3] Max Weber, "Politics as a vocation" in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology*, London: Routledge, 1998 [1919], p. 78.

[4] Fred Cooper, *Africa since 1940: the past in the present*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 5, 156–60 (cited by Cahen, p. 3).

[5] W.I. Thomas and D.S. Thomas, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences", in *The Unadjusted Girl: behaviour problems and programs*. New York: Knopf 1928, pp. 511–512. Timothy Mitchell, "Society, economy, and the state effect", in George Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture, State formation after the cultural turn*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999 (cited by Justin Pearce, p. 131).

[6] Luís Cerqueira de Brito, 'Une relécture nécessaire : la genèse du parti-État Frelimo', *Politique Africaine*, No. 29, 1988, pp. 15–28 (cited by Cahen, p. 8).

[7] Patrick Chabal, *A History of Lusophone Africa*, London: Hurst & Co., 2002, pp. 37–58.

[8] See the chapter by Sumich and Peace in this volume.

[9] Ruth First, The *Barrel of a Gun. Political Power in Africa and the Coupd d'État*, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970, p. 104. See Michel Cahen, "Check on socialism in Mozambique – what check? What socialism?", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 57, 1993, p. 50.

[10] Gavin Williams, "Reforming Africa: continuities and changes" in *Africa South of the Sahara* 2004, 33rd ed., London: Europa Publications, 2003, p. 3.

The nationalist and the developmental projects could be brought together in a common ideology of 'socialism', whether of the 'African', *ujamaa*, or Marxist-Leninist varieties[11]. In some ways, socialism in Africa was another word for nationalism. Marxism, preferably with Leninism, provided a language for nationalisms that were radical in their demands, actions, and intentions. Nationalism, socialism, and the revolution of the oppressed could all be taken into a teleological idea of a 'National Democratic Revolution', directed by a Marxist-Leninist party, which could define the movement for, and also after liberation (Cahen, p. 10). In the 1980s, the idea of Marxism-Leninism and the proclaimed movement towards socialism could be set aside. The ideas of the nation and of the state could not be.

Elites and Progress

Nationalists first needed a nation and the idea and apparatuses of the state, which the colonial power brought into being. Colonial conquest defined the territories within whose boundaries nationalists would 'imagine' and give political meaning to the nation and stake their claims to legitimate state authority. In sub-Saharan Africa, only in Tanzania has Swahili been established as an official language which defines a national identity. Elsewhere the *national* language of elites and political movements and of official discourse and state institutions is inherited from the colonial rulers, whether or not it is understood by the population. In Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau only a small per cent of the people speak Portuguese or are able to read and write it (Birmingham, pp. 141–2)[12]. In Angola, President dos Santos surprised David Birmingham in 2006 when he declared, 'Our language is Portuguese.' (Birmingham, p. 142)

Nationalists could not write their texts on *tabulae rasae*. African societies had and have common, similar, diverse and conflicting kinship systems, language, education, religions, social relations, political arrangements, and historical experiences. They engage people in multiplex relationships, which acquire significance in times and places. Within the space of colonial territories, and across their boundaries, they are constructed into pan-ethnic identities. These may be a foundation for,

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[11] See Cahen's chapter and Chabal, *History*, pp. 58–64.
[12] Cahen, "Check on socialism in Mozambique," pp. 49–50.

be invoked, aligned with, assimilated to, or denied or suppressed by nationalist movements but they always raise questions for and offer a challenge to the nationalist project.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, literate coastal elites referred to the liberal traditions of England, France and Portugal in claiming the rights of citizens. The commonalities among them were relational and locational and lay in their own claims to status. The ubiquitous application of 'Creole' for different cultural, linguistic and political communities obscures the historical and sociological contexts and the 'discursive processes' 'within which people identified themselves and one another'[13]. In Angola, 'the *filhos da terra* ... spoke of themselves in terms of both their civilised practices and their filial relationship with Africa, distinguishing themselves from the "corrupt" white and the "primitive" black'[14]. In colonial Guiné-Bissau, as Havik tells us, the *Kriston* were commercial, military, and cultural intermediaries linking the Portuguese with producers and traders beyond the coast and taking with them Krio as the language of commercial intercourse (Havik p. 33). In Moçambique, the administrative capital moved south to Delagoa Bay [Lourenço Marques/Maputo], in response to the conjunctures of the opening of the Suez Canal and reduction of coastal shipping, and exports by rail of gold from the Z.A.R. [*Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*], thereby displacing the established élites of the north with a modern elite in Lourenço Marques[15]. The *filhos da terra*, or the *Kriston*, or the *forro* of São Tomé, or the élites of Moçambique depended on the Portuguese and vice versa, yet the relations between them and with peoples in the 'interior' were always potentially adversarial (Cahen, p. 8; Derlugian, p. 33–5). To identify them as proto-nationalists would be anachronistic.

Until 1961, the Portuguese administrators defined almost all the people of the colonies as *indigenas* (natives), subject to customary law and *xibalo*

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[13] Rosa Williams, "Migration and miscegenation in the narrative of the Angolan state, 1875–1912," in Philip J. Havik and Malyn Newitt (eds), *Creole Societies in the Portuguese Colonial Empire*, Lusophone Studies 6, University of Bristol, 2007, pp. 169–70. Jacopo Corrado, *The Creole Elite and the Rise of Angolan Proto-nationalism 1870–1920*. Amherst NY: Cambria Press, 2008, p. 236.

[14] R. Williams, "Migration and miscegenation", p. 157. Corrado, *The Creole Elite*. Corrado, "The fall of a Creole elite? Angola at the turn of the twentieth century: the decline of the Euro-African urban community.", *Luso-Brasilian Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2011, 100–119. (Fernando Pimenta refers to a quite different category of 'Euro-Africans' in his contribution to this volume).

[15] Cahen, "Check on socialism in Mozambique", pp. 49–50.

(forced labour). Africans could acquire the legal status of *assimilados* if they had sufficient education and could demonstrate that they had adopted the civilised way of life of the Portuguese colonisers. In between were the '*mestiço*', neither black nor white and often from the families of the nineteenth century elites, the colonial Europeans, and above them the authentic Portuguese (Pimenta, p. 117). David Birmingham writes:

> In the last phase of colonial rule the old Angolan Creoles were challenged not only by white immigrants but also by a new class of young men. (...) These 'new *assimilados*' still belonged to African society and spoke Kimbundu in their leisure time, but they had been absorbed into the lower ranks of the colonial establishment by being educated to speak and write in Portuguese[16].

In the later colonial period, nationalists identified themselves as the party of progress, overthrowing the colonial masters and bringing the benefits of reason and enlightenment to the people. In Guiné-Bissau, for example, they fought for '*Unidade, luta e progresso*' (Unity, Struggle, and Progress) which, with no evident irony, became the 'national values of the "New Order" '(Havik, p. 29) taking in the themes of Brasil's national motto of '*Ordem e Progresso*'[17]. In Moçambique, Angola, and Guiné-Bissau, local or even regional rejection of, or resistance to, the party of progress could be ascribed to tribalisms and feudal elements; ignorance, obscurantism, and backward traditions; and to racism[18]. As Havik observes, 'The strategy for hegemony was rooted in the historical claim of Christianised Guineans and Cape Verdean Creoles as privileged intermediaries' (Havik, p. 43). Many of FRELIMO's secular nationalists were drawn from 'subordinate colonial elites', of *assimilados*, *mestiço*, Asian, or Goan origin (Derlugian, p. 72). Sumich emphasises that FRELIMO's nationalism was a modernist 'vision of a nation as of yet uncreated, a nation not built on its glorious past but on a radiant future still to come.' (Sumich, p. 83)

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[16] David Birmingham, "Angola" in Chabal, *History*, pp. 147–8.

[17] The motto was explicitly derived from Comte's 'Positive philosophy', which connects the development of society from past to present and to a future guided by the sure trusteeship of an industrial patriciate' [try substituting 'national liberation movement'!] M. P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 27–35. For Comte, see Gertrud Lenzer, (ed., with Introduction), *August Comte and Positivism: the essential writings.* New York: Transaction Books, 2nd ed. 1997.

[18] For example, Aristides Pereira, *Uma Luta, Um Partido, Dois Paises*, Lisbon, Ed. Notícias, 2002, pp. 102–12 (cited by Havik, pp. 31–2; see also Derlugian, p. 72).

Nationalisms and Liberation

Political hegemony did not come to the revolutionary leadership of its own accord. The struggles for national liberation from colonial oppression were more than that, and also less than that, differing in their histories and geographies, the character and salience of issues, in their forms of action, and in their local and even national political allegiances. The national political movements were able to respond to specific grievances and experiences of colonial rule. Nationalist movements trace their own origins to specific events, the strike in Pidjiguity docks in 1959 (Havik, p. 30), the firing on petitioners at Mueda in northern Mozambique in 1960, and the Angolan prison-break of 4 February 1961, 'the day on which the Angolan people, under the leadership of the MPLA, took the initiative in rising against Portuguese rule' (cited Pearce, p. 132). Derlugian lists the demands of the petitioners who were fired on after they tried to release prisoners at Mueda in northern Moçambique in 1960: an end to *xibalo* (forced labour), the right to own shops and agricultural cooperatives, and better prices from government for their cotton (Derlugian, pp. 77–78). These atrocities facilitated mobilization but they all preceded the formation of the liberation movements.

The national liberation movements sustained and expanded their struggles against colonial armies, conscripted in Portugal and recruited from the colonised population itself. The government of Marcelo Caetano could not sustain the fiscal, military, and political costs of colonial wars nor dislodge the guerrilla armies. Its colonial failures were an immediate reason for the coup by the Armed Forces Movement on 25 April 1974 and Portugal's 'Carnation revolution'. Portugal transferred power to independent governments in 1974 and 1975. PAIGC and FRELIMO could take over the capitals and free people from colonial exactions and repression. In January 1975, even before the Portuguese reluctantly conceded Angolan independence, contending parties fought for the prize of the capital city. MPLA was able take control of Luanda when a South African flying column was repelled with Cuban troops and Soviet arms. This did not bring them control of the countryside. The movement of the MPLA and Cuban troops into the *planalto* gave UNITA the scope to capture political support and make this a '"successful" defeat' (Péclard, p. 111–2). Péclard argues that UNITA was not an 'ethnic' or 'religious' movement. He explores carefully the historical intersection of ovimbundu elites and Protestant missions and 'how with their educational system, Christian missions were … a place where an elite of new *assimilados* could emerge without having to turn its back to its culture of origin' (Péclard, p. 110).

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In all the Portuguese colonies and the liberated Lusophone states, the victorious parties claimed their exclusive right to represent all the people, to the extent that they could exercise the administrative capacities and military power to do so. They alone were authentic nationalists, who gave substance to the 'nation' and to 'nationalism'. They displaced the demand for 'national self-determination' from the liberal discourse of rights to the claims of nations and their own rights to define and speak for the nation and for the people. This excludes from the public memory predecessors who do not fit the current political mythology and dismisses or marginalizes rivals or dissidents, past or present (Havik, p. 48; Derlugian, p. 71; Basto, p. 61). MPLA and UNITA contested one another's conceptions of 'the nation'. MPLA positioned itself the sole national party standing above ethnic and regional interests; UNITA claimed to speak for 'the Ovimbundu people, and blacks and southerners more generally, who had got the worst of colonial rule, and [claimed] that the MPLA, representing specific regional and class interests was in no position to represent Angola at large' (Pearce, p. 131). Both could be right. MPLA's claim to be a truly national party gave it African and international credibility that UNITA lacked. The monopoly of representation was secured, first by the PAIGC, and then by FRELIMO and MPLA by taking armed liberation movements to independence and getting Portuguese and international recognition.

At the international level, the claims of the official liberation movements went relatively unchallenged. Derlugian concludes: 'FRELIMO's organizational success was clearly related to the inordinate ability of its intelligencia leaders to benefit from global alliances.' (Derlugian, p. 71). PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA were able to appeal to the admiration and solidarity of the global left, whose language of national liberation and resistance to imperialism the nationalists could speak fluently. The liberation wars were struggles against the last remnants (almost) of colonialism in Africa, of fascism in Portugal, and its imperialist alliance with NATO and for international solidarity with the liberation of oppressed people. They were able to align with the Soviet bloc while gaining the active support of 'Africanist' radicals, the New Left, Trotskyist political factions, and liberal sympathizers. This author remembers dancing in a packed hall in London to celebrate Mozambican independence. MPLA fought a war with Soviet-bloc arms and Cuban troops to repel the people against an illegitimate rival and the South African armed forces, occupying Namibia, with not-so-covert support from the U.S.A. FRELIMO defended itself from RENAMO, which had been brought into existence by the Rhodesian Special Forces and then armed by the South African military. The choice, not only on the left, was self-evident.

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Nationalisms need to define the present by narratives that re/present their past origins and project the 'sure road' to the future. Integral to the imagining of the nation is to imagine a 'national culture'. Maria-Benedita Basto brings out what Frantz Fanon calls the 'Reciprocal Bases Of National Culture And The Fight For Freedom'[19]. Fanon conceived of 'the fight for national existence which sets culture moving and opens it to the doors of creativity'[20]. In similar vein, Amilcar Cabral stated that 'the liberation struggle is, above all, a struggle both for the preservation and survival of the cultural values of the people and for the harmonization and development of these values within a national framework'[21]. For Fanon, 'The new humanity cannot do otherwise than to define a new humanism both for itself and for others'[22]. FRELIMO defined its task in 1972 'in the creation of a new man and in the improvement and unification of our culture'[23]. In this volume, Maria-Benedito Basto examines *Poesia de Combate*, first published during Mozambique's war of liberation in 1971. When it was republished in 1979 the order and even the wording of the poems had changed along with national priorities and the move from a revolutionary party to a national state-party. '*Venceremos*' replaced '*O guerrilheiro*' as the opening to the volume; the *guerrilheiro* was now configured as "guide of the people" and the model for society after independence (Basto, p. 52).

Nationalists had to find ways to finesse the awkward distance between the 'revolutionary *élites*' and the people they sought to lead[24]. Fanon concluded at the end of his scathing analysis of 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness' that 'The nation does not exist except in a programme which has been worked out by revolutionary leaders and taken up with full understanding and enthusiasm by the masses...'[25]. Amilcar Cabral recognized with unintended foresight, that 'the only social sector capable of having consciousness in the first place of the reality of imperialist domination and of handing the State apparatus inherited from that domination is the native petty bourgeoisie. (...) The colonial situation ... offers ... the

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[19] Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 190, (cited by Basto, p. 58).

[20] Fanon, *Wretched*, p. 193.

[21] Amilcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle: speeches and writings*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979, p. 153.

[22] Fanon, *Wretched*, p. 198.

[23] Frelimo, 'Brochure "1° Seminário Cultural, Dez 71/Jan 72', 1972 (signed by Armando Guebuza), (cited by Basto), p. 56.

[24] Fanon, *Wretched*, p.161.

[25] Fanon, *Wretched*, pp.163–4.

petty bourgeoisie the historical opportunity of leading the struggle'[26]. Cabral explained that "to lead a people to liberation and progress, the fundamental need was a vanguard" and that the application of party principles required "… collective leadership" in the form of 'democratic centralism'[27]. Both Fanon and Cabral, despite themselves, resolve the problem into one of political and moral commitment, from which nationalisms cannot extricate themselves. As Michel Cahen writes in this volume, 'This *project of the nation* is always closely linked to a paradigm of authoritarian modernization.'

Party-States and Economies

At independence, parties translated the liberation war into a party-state, ruling for and in the name of the people. In taking over the central institutions of the state, parties separated themselves from the people in whose names they claimed to rule (Havik, p. 37)[28]. At the time of independence, PAIGC did not command uncontested allegiance among the Fula. In Mozambique, Malyn Newitt writes, "FRELIMO … had no organized presence in most of the country and had already experienced opposition amongst the largest ethnic group, the makua-speaking people"[29]. They had to be brought into the nation by the powers of the state. The successful liberation movements could mould a public representation of nationhood and citizenry but could only fail to eliminate local particularity in its post-independence pursuit of administrative uniformity. The liberation wars in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique engaged the guerrilla movements with local people, and also with social and political structures and the colonial administration with which they were often unfamiliar. Pursuit of revolution from rural bases required a degree of local accountability. The exercise of state authority did not. The Guinean regime "stole the State from us … now … our voice is not heard there"[30].

In 1977, the parties in power in the Lusophone countries all declared themselves Marxist-Leninist in their political systems, the economic strategies, and to a greater (Angola) or lesser (Guinea-Bissau) extent, their

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[26] Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, pp. 134–6
[27] Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, pp. 85, 246.
[28] Rosemary Galli and Jocelyn Jones, *Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economy, Society*. Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1987. Forrest 'Guinea-Bissau' in Chabal, *History*, pp. 236–251.
[29] Malyn Newitt, "Mozambique" in Chabal, *History*, p. 196.
[30] Balanta elder, cited by Lino Bicari (in Havik, p. 37).

international alignments. Ideology did matter. It legitimated and also gave meaning to the party's monopoly of office, privilege, international recognition, and use of violence. It gave direction to and justified state-directed industrial policies, abortive attempts at collective farming, and control of currency exchange, foreign imports, and food prices. The consequences of these policies were extremely repressive, most visibly in Angola in the purge and massacres that ensued after the failure of Nito Alves's brutal and unlikely 'leftist' attempt to seize power (Birmingham, p. 145)[31], and under the dictatorial regime of 'Nino' Vieira in Guinea-Bissau (Havik, p. 37).

Nationalist economic strategies, pursued in the name of socialism, involved extensive state ownership, controls of prices, imports and foreign exchange. Economically, they were predictably disastrous. They contracted the rural and urban economies and increased dependence on imports of subsidised grain from the U.S.A[32]. Agricultural policies were met by evasion and obstruction. Price controls reduced prices to producers and increased the prices paid by consumers and were only mitigated by black markets and smuggling. Industrial policies increased imports and reduced production[33]. As Manuel Ennes Ferreira argues, Angola's 'Strategy of Industrial Transformation' to "substitute for imports ... transformed itself exactly into its opposite, giving origin to a policy, de facto, of import promotion"[34].

In 1977, FRELIMO committed itself to a "democratic centralism ... extended to all the society" and to state developmentalism[35]. Its policies followed colonial precedents, with admixtures of Tanzanian villagization (Cahen, p. 13)[36], and Leninist conceptions of the transformation of

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[31] Also Birmingham, "Angola", pp. 163–4. For a detailed contemporary account of the politics of the coup, but not of its consequences, see Paul Fauvet, "Nitista coup in Angola", *Review Of African Political Economy*, No.9, 1978, pp. 85–104.

[32] Gunilla Andrae and Björn Beckman, *The Wheat Trap: Bread and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*. London: Zed Books, 1985. Philip Raikes, *Modernizing Hunger,* London: James Currey, 1988.

[33] Manuel Ennes Ferreira, *A indústria em tempo de Guerra* (*Angola, 1975–91*), Lisbon: Ed&icedil;cões Cosmos, 1999, p. 468, Fig. 9 & 10; Anexos VI.

[34] Ennes Ferreira, *A indústria,* p. 485.

[35] Cahen, "Check on socialism in Mozambique".

[36] Newitt, "Mozambique", pp. 200–6. Andrew Coulson, "Agricultural policies in mainland Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy*, No.10, pp. 74–100 and in Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts and Gavin Williams (eds). *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 52–89, See also other contributions on African countries.

industry and agriculture[37]. FRELIMO moved peasants into communal villages (*aldeias communais*), thereby reducing production and sales. They went back to the colonial strategy of requiring peasants to deliver their cotton quotas to the cotton buyers, João Ferreira dos Santos and state co-operatives[38]. Party officials did not succeed in getting peasants to do what they wanted but they did, predictably, reduce agricultural production and alienate the peasant producers from FRELIMO's new state.

Repressive one-party and disastrous state-controlled development strategies were not peculiar to the Lusophone countries. One-party states were ubiquitous in post-colonial Africa, whether they were of 'conservative', 'socialist', or 'Marxist' varieties. They brought opposition politicians and parties into the fold, and repressed or excluded outsiders, if only *pour encourager les autres*. For thirty years, they enabled a number of presidents, usually of a venerable age, to oversee the management of political institutions and contests for political office and its rewards. Party and military elites appropriated the rewards of power, on a quite extraordinary scale in oil economies such as Nigeria, and Angola. Office-holders at national, provincial, and local levels could act as 'gatekeepers'[39] of international, public and private resources, taking most for themselves and leaving hardly anything over for anybody else. Their dependence on these 'gatekeepers' at higher levels precluded independent or collective action on their own part[40].

These policies were adopted widely though not universally in Africa for some of the same reasons and with most of the same consequences. State finances imploded in the 1980s, as a result of perverse policies, unpayable debts from foreign banks, high real interests, and global economic recession. International agencies responded by insisting on structural adjustment policies as conditions of loans. Imposing the conditions and putting

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[37] Was FRELIMO's Marxism 'Stalinized' as Cahen describes it? Lenin's Marxism might do as well. (See Derlugian, p. 80). For the Bolshevik vision of the future, see N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhenskii, *The ABC of Communism* London: Penguin, 1969 [1922].

[38] Dinerman, *Counter-Revolution and Revisionism*, pp. 96–106, 201–12. Cahen, "Check on socialism in Mozambique," p.34. João Gomes Cravinho, "Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo ideology and the Frelimo state". D Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995.

[39] Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 5. Chris Allen, "Understanding African politics", *Review Of African Political Economy*, No. 65, 1995, pp. 301–320.

[40] Sam Nolutshungu, "Fragments of a democracy: reflections on class and politics in Nigeria", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1992,101. See also the debates excerpted in Chris Allen and Gavin Williams (eds), *Sociology of Developing Societies: Sub-Saharan Africa*, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 161–202.

the policies into practice was not as straightforward as agencies and their critics assumed.

Nationalist policies gave way to economic reforms in 1983 and 1987 in Mozambique, 1986 in Guinea-Bissau, 1987 in São Tomé and Principe, and 1988 in Angola (partially implemented and mainly postponed), each with the support of the IMF and, except in Angola, under its supervision[41]. 'Liberal' economic reforms created new channels for profit-making by people with overlapping political and economic connection to parties, governments, and aid agencies[42]. Aid flows from government and non-governmental organisations created new 'gates' and a wider class of political beneficiaries. The policies raised the stranglehold of state control on economic activity. Predictably, they did not attract direct foreign investment. They also raised living costs and left African producers unprotected from international competition and grain and rice imports subsidised by the United States and the European Union. The benefits and beneficiaries of adjustment loans have depended on continuing financial transfers to meet current expenditures, locking donors and beneficiaries into their mutual relationships.

By 1990, one-party and military regimes across Africa faced public opposition to their rule, economic collapse, resistance to the costs of adjustment for ordinary people, and the withdrawal of support from or the desertion of their international patrons. Their loss of credibility opened space for competitive party politics, although the informal rules of the political game, the skills to play it and to adapt the rules to purpose continued. These processes took place over briefer periods in Lusophone countries and in the contexts of civil war in Angola and Mozambique. Military superiority and control of oil revenues put MPLA in political dominance in Angola. 'Liberation movements' overthrew African regimes in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Rwanda, following a 'Lusophone model' of authoritarian political rule by leaders of the liberation movements. Competitive politics could open the way to political violence and civil war in, for example, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau, part of the interlinked political violence of west African countries[43].

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[41] Chabal, *History*.

[42] M. Anne Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique: the politics of privatization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pitcher, "Conditions, commitments and the politics of restructuring in Africa", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37, 2004, pp. 375–98.

[43] Chabal, *History*, pp. 88–136. Michael Cowen and Liisa Liaakso (eds), *Multi-party Elections in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey, 2002, A.R. Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield (eds)), *Turning Points in African* Democracy, Oxford: James Currey, 2009. For an earlier,

The same political elites who assumed power after the liberation could first prescribe Marxism-Leninism and then neo-liberalism. In Angola and Mozambique, "The state itself – site of its own reproduction – had a central economic role"[44]. It continued to do so in a liberal economic and 'dominant party' political system[45]. State developmentalism can give way to capitalist developmentalism. Social networks and political connections gave access to education and status. Money became a more direct means for acquiring and reproducing economic position, status and styles of life (Sumich, p. 91).

Successes and Failures

If the liberation movements were so successful in their battles for independence, why was it so difficult for them to hold on to power? The simplest reason, valid as far as it goes, is that they were subject to armed foreign intervention. An alternative explanation, also valid, is their disastrous economic policies, which forced the citizens to bear the scarcities of the controlled economy and then the costs of economic liberalization. The contributions to this book show that it was more complicated than either.

A second question is why, if their rule had such devastating consequences, did the MPLA and FRELIMO though not, ultimately, the PAIGC hold on to power? Again there are simple, valid, reasons.

They managed the state administration and controlled its security services; they had international recognition; and they could impose military force, their own and that from allies such as Cuba in Angola, and Zimbabwe in Mozambique. Again, as we see from this book, there is more to it than that.

In answering them, we must address the further question of the relevance of 'Lusophone' Africa as a framework for and subject of analysis. How far are the experiences of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau comparable to one another, other than in their shared participation in *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* (CPLP)? Apparent

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very condensed view, see Gavin Williams, "Democracy as idea and as process", *Journal of African-American History*, Vol. 86, No. 4, 2003, pp. 343–351. *Africa South of the Sahara 2012*, 41st edition, 2011.

[44] Cahen, "Check on socialism", p. 50.

[45] Morier-Genoud, "Mozambique since 1989: Shaping democracy after Socialism" in A.R.Mustapha & L.Whitfield (eds), *Turning Points in African Democracy* (Oxford: James Currey, 2009), pp.153–166.

similarities may hide divergences, parallels, and convergences in institutions and processes.

Institutions have a remarkable capacity to perpetuate their forms, across changes in ideologies, policies, and international political alignments. State institutions regulate the ways in which formal and informal official business is conducted and thereby teach the state's servants that these are how things can be and are to be done. It is easier to change institutional forms than to transform them in substance and, anyway, new 'states' face many of the problems of the old ones in administering the system of state institutions.

Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau shared a common heritage of Portuguese colonial rule, wars of national liberation, and dates of independence. The *Estado Novo* imposed a similar system of administrative rule, political repression, legal and social stratification, and an imperial economic strategy on all three colonies. The ruling parties followed the Salazar state in applying the use of force, legitimately or illegitimately, to manage or suppress any real or imagined threats to the enforcement of their authority. The capital cities from which the colonial power administered the colonies and imposed its rule became the centres over which the nationalist revolutionaries first had to take control and from which, like the Portuguese government before and after 1900, they had to extend the authority of the 'state of the revolution' across the national territory and to sustain it through the exercise of force.

There were important differences in the geographies and histories of the three colonies. In very simple terms, Angola had an established European community and subsequently extensive Portuguese displacement of people from the land to make way for Portuguese settlers. Railways linked the coast to interior and to the copper mines in the Congo. There was a much higher level of industrial development and agricultural exports than in Mozambique. Mozambique was integrated into the economies of South Africa and Rhodesia through labour migration and rail connections. There had a smaller number of settlers, a small but significant Indian merchant community, fewer exports than Angola, and a lack of transport connection from the north to the south of the Colony. It is hard to see what the Portuguese were doing in Guinea-Bissau, other than asserting their credibility as a colonial power, and why they held on to it at such cost. Instead of keeping Angola and Mozambique in Portuguese hands, the war for Guinea-Bissau was ironically crucial to the Portuguese coup and revolution in 1974.

In both Angola and Mozambique, African social and political elites were defined and also stratified by the status arising from their occupation, their competence in Portuguese, and their social origins and geographical locations. In Guinea-Bissau, the local elites were Cape Verdeans, recruited to fill minor administrative positions. Comparisons may be found in the coastal elites in Francophone and Anglophone colonies and in south Africa, in their claims to political voice and status recognition, and the subsequent prominence of later generations in nationalist movements.

In some respects, what the three colonies shared, Angola and Mozambique in particular, was not what they inherited from the colonial period but from the centralized political and economic institutions and their ideological underpinnings after 1974 and their abandonment in form and to a much lesser extent in practice at the end of the 1980s. Civil wars and external interventions, from South Africa and Rhodesia in particular, threatened the security of both Angola and Mozambique but this alone does not explain why UNITA and RENAMO, despite their own violence towards local populations, should have been able to claim so much support in extensive and politically and militarily strategic parts of the two countries.

Ruling parties created the conditions for their own opposition. National political elites, centred in the capital cities, better educated and at least in their own view, better qualified to rule, left or placed their provincial counterparts in a secondary position. Generation divided the older and new party elites rather than 'traditionalism' and 'modernism'. Between 1975 and 1979, FRELIMO abolished the colonial *regulos* and replaced them with party secretaries, though the shift in generation did not necessarily replace networks of chiefly authority, which were revalidated as bearers of cultural values and administrative intermediaries[46]. Péclard explains that after MPLA and Cuban forces captured Huambo, MPLA brought in younger cadres as the 'new forces of the nation' rather than incorporate the local mission-educated 'cultural nationalists', clerks, school teachers and nurses into the local administration (Péclard, p. 111). They were both 'modernizers' but their conceptions of a modern nation and a modern society grew from their different origins, situations and, as Péclard shows in the case of the Ovimbundu, cultural orientations.

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[46] See, for example, Dinerman, *Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism*, pp. 193–234.

All three countries were involved in civil wars, extending beyond their own boundaries, but the timing of the conflicts differed and the participants were not the same apart from the engagement of South African armed forces in both Angola and Mozambique. Here too, there were important differences. The South African government wanted to establish its hegemony over the southern African region but its primary concern in Angola was to ensure its occupation of Namibia. The turning point in the war came in 1988 when the Cuban and Angolan forces repelled the South African offensive at Cuito Cuanavale leading to a peace agreement at the end of that year. In Mozambique, the apartheid regime took over Rhodesia's alliance with its client RENAMO, and continued its support even after the Nkomati accord with Mozambique in 1983. It neither engaged its own forces in any direct battles and nor did it need to do so. In both Angola and Mozambique, civil conflicts acquired their own dynamics so that internal peace agreements only took place in 1991 and 1992 (Cahen, p. ??, Derlugian, pp. 70–71)[47].

PAIGC ruled Guinea-Bissau under Luís Cabral and, after a coup in 1980, under João Bernardo 'Nino' Viera, until he was himself deposed in 1998. Subsequent contentions for power and office were decided by military coups, armed conflicts, troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, arms smuggling and its proceeds, abortive or completed elections, personal and ethnic rivalries and political assassinations, the last of a sequence being of Vieira himself, who had returned to be elected to the presidency in 2005 (Havik, p. 41–2)[48]. What the disparate histories of all three countries have in common is the decisive place of military force in deciding the battles for political office, and the different capacities of the parties of liberation to sustain their control over the machinery of government, thanks to or despite external interventions.

Two decades and one, or two, civil wars later, FRELIMO and MPLA remain in power. They have confirmed and even legitimated their political domination and kept the military forces strictly under their authority. In Angola, the 1992 elections divided town and country. According to David Birmingham, "The countryside voted for the opposition, for Savimbi and for change, while the towns voted for the government, for preferential economic treatment, and for armed protection from the hungry raiders out in the rural areas." The outcome of the elections reopened armed

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[47] Birmingham, "Angola", p. 164–172. Newitt, "Mozambique", pp. 229–234.

[48] Joshua Forrest, "Guinea-Bissau" in Chabal, *History*, pp. 236–263. *Africa South of the Sahara, 2012.*

conflicts, which could and did only come to an end with the death of Jonas Savimbi and the public display of his corpse in 2002 bringing to an end the "depraved conflict between a corrupt government mesmerized by wealth and inhuman opposition obsessed by power"[49].

Both Angola and Mozambique may be described as 'dominant-party' systems. They are able to disperse patronage, on a far greater scale in Angola than in Mozambique, and bring the political process itself within their own political orbits. The regime in Guinea-Bissau not only had few resources but also suffered under a party dictatorship which took more and more of less and less until there was nothing much left except the proceeds of cross-border arms trading. FRELIMO and MPLA share many of the features of the more successful single-party states of the period from 1960 to 1990 and of more recent states with multi-party elections, where legislative elections accompanied presidential rule, with or without elections for the presidency.

Since 2002, both MPLA and FRELIMO have extended and consolidated their legislative domination. MPLA secured an overwhelming majority of votes cast for the legislature in 2008. Elections are schedule for 2012. FRELIMO were surprised at the fact that RENAMO was able to get more votes than FRELIMO in five of the country's provinces in 1994 and six in 1999, but probably should not have been. FRELIMO's lack of a political presence in the central provinces, as Newitt remarks, preceded independence. In subsequent elections, FRELIMO got an electoral stranglehold, so that it defeated RENAMO in all eleven provinces in 2009, with some unnecessary help from the administration[50].

In any political system, the most revealing question is always where does the money come from and where does it go? In Mozambique, the relations among the political classes and with national and international aid donors became more complex under a 'liberal' political and economic dispensation. The Mozambican state and the political elites depend on aid from numerous foreign governmental and non-governmental agencies to pay for the recurrent budget and development projects. Aid transfers were 23 per cent of Mozambique's *gross national income* in 2004, of which 80% were grants, and debt relief made up 22%. Mozambique's economic recovery has made it one of the star pupils of the syllabus

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[49] Birmingham "Angola", pp. 177, 182.

[50] Newitt, "Mozambique", pp. 224–4 (1994), 232–3 (1999). Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mozelectarchive.htm and http://www.eisa.org.za/ WEP/angola.htm.

prescribed by the international agencies. As in many other African coun-
tries, external advisers engage directly in the policy-making process.
Nevertheless, its international funders cannot choose to withdraw and
just dictate policies unilaterally. Both sides must engage in games of stra-
tegic bargaining[51]. Party and state institutions act in combination as
national and international gatekeepers. Factional politics and contests
for spoils take place within FRELIMO. Political and economic inter-
ests have to be accommodated and resources more widely shared in
Mozambique than in Angola. This is possible because, as Sumich com-
ments, "Education and status tend to reinforce each other" in Mozambique
"… which allows access to extremely powerful social networks" (Sumich,
p. 92).

   Angola is more straightforward in its sources of revenue: oil, and more
recently Chinese lines of credit[52]. Here too rivalries among the political
elites for economic shares take place within the ruling party and state.
The scale, though, is of a quite different order to Mozambique or Guinea-
Bissau. Angola paid for its civil war with revenues from oil extracted from
Cabinda enclave under the protection of Cuban troops to Gulf Oil, later
Chevron-Gulf (Birmingham, pp. 144, 147). In Angola, oil revenues are con-
trolled from the centre. They make it possible for President Dos Santos to
create a 'presidential state' avoid direct elections, and for the close-knit
-ruling elites to avoid any accountability to clients, let alone voters, post-
pone economic reforms, appropriate public funds, export their winnings
to foreign banks, and import food cheaply for urban consumers[53]. Angola's
ruling elites face outwards, economically, culturally, and in their concep-
tions of their places in the world. Yet, they fit too well Frantz Fanon's
characterization of the 'national bourgeoisie' as "completely canalized
into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to

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[51] Paolo di Renzo and Joseph Hanlon, "Mozambique: contested sovereignty? The dilem-
mas of aid dependence." and other chapters in Lindsay Whitfield (ed.), *The politics of Aid:
African strategies for dealing with donors*', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Paul
Mosley, Jane Harragin, and John Toye, *Aid and Power: the World Bank and policy-based
lending*, 2nd ed. 1995. London: Routledge, 1995. Graham Harrison, *The World Bank and
Africa: the construction of governance states*. London: Routledge, 2004.

[52] On the complexities of Angola's relations with China, see Manuel Ennis Ferreira,
"China in Angola: just a passion for oil?" and also Soares de Oliveira, "Making sense of
Chinese oil investment in Africa", in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de
Oliveira (eds), *China Returns to Africa a rising power and a continent embrace*. London:
C. Hurst, 2009, pp. 295–318, 83–110.

[53] Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*. London: C. Hurst,
2007, esp. pp. 49–62, 123–59. Birmingham, "Angola", pp. 162–3, 181–3.

be to keep in the running and be part of the racket'[54]. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira identifies Angola as one of the 'successful failed' petro-states in which the 'political process will be unstable and fragmentary, but the structure of politics itself will be stable and viable – as long as oil lasts'[55].

Lusophone Africas in Comparative Perspectives

There are naturally continuities in the distinctive histories of each country before, at the time of, and after independence, but many of these have at different times taken participants and observers by surprise. Similar institutional forms and historical processes are common to all three and more particularly to Angola and Mozambique. These are as much or more than the result of changes after independence as attributable to their colonial legacies. Their time sequences differ and their apparent similarities may be misleading.

The political institutions and economic strategies that the Lusophone countries adopted and their unsustainabilities cannot be attributed just to the malign influence of Marxism-Leninism. They were shared with many other African countries, whose politics were more or less stable and economic policies less or more disastrous. Tanzania, Mozambique's closest neighbour and ally, exemplified both political stability and economic failure. Mozambique benefited from the same structural adjustment policies as most African countries. There was more scope for economic growth after recovering from a catastrophic war and more international budgetary support than in other African countries. Angola's kleptocracy did not depend on foreign aid to keep the President and his revolving circle of clients in the money they became accustomed to. It obviously shared some features with the political economy of Nigeria, except in being more centralized and not under the same constraints to share the spoils with state-based power holders.

African parallels are to be found in different ways for the similar and diverse histories of each of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, even if Angolans, do not always want to be told so. Corrupt politics is a feature of all of these though with far greater scope and concentration in Angola. Centralization of power and deference to those who exercise it are hardly exclusively African. Corruption is embedded in many political

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[54] Fanon, *Wretched*, p. 122.
[55] Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics*, pp. 61–62.

systems and links oil corporations blatantly with African governments and political elites. Put simply, divergencies, parallels, and convergencies can be found where we look for them. Things are never quite the same from one case to another. The revealing examples may appear where we do not expect to find them.